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TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY: FAST TRACK FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?"
INTRODUCTION
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is the name given to the presidential
authority previously known as "fast track."' TPA is the delegation of power by
Congress to the executive branch in order to facilitate the implementation of
international trade agreements in the United States.2 International trade agreements
negotiated on the fast track are reviewed by Congress on an accelerated time frame
and are subject to a yes or no vote by Congress without any amendments.' In
August 2002, Congress granted TPA to President Bush,4 providing a fast-track
mechanism to the presidency for the first time in eight years.5 Although the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 has been heralded as a vital tool
in the creation of additional international trade agreements,6 the Act subjects the
* I would like to extend my appreciation to my parents for their encouragement and
support.
Bob Deans, With "Fast Track" Going Nowhere, Bush Pulls A Switch, Cox NEWS
WASH., Apr. 23, 2001, at http://www.coxnews.com/washingtonbureau/staff/deans/04-23-
01 COXBUSHFAST0423.html (on file with author).
But fast track powers were derailed seven years ago, and now the term itself is
snakebitten. President Bush will have nothing to do with it.... Instead, the Bush
team uses the term "trade promotion authority," and Bush hopes that before the
year is out Congress will grant him the power it long withheld from his
predecessor, Bill Clinton.
Id.; see also Bruce J. Janigian, Global and Regional Trade Developments, 15 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 99, 100 (2002); What Economic Integration in the Hemisphere Means to Florida
Industries, Panel Discussion, 14 FLA. J. INT'LL. 79 (2001) [hereinafterEconomic Integration
Panel Discussion]. The terms "fast track" and "trade promotion authority" have become
interchangeable. LENORE SEK, CONGR. RES. SERv., PUB. No. IB 10084, TRADE PROMOTION
AUTH. (FAST-TRACK AumoRrrY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS): BACKGROUND & DEVS. IN THE
107TH CONGRESS (2003).
2 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Questions & Answers on US. Trade Promotion Authority,
at http://www.tpa.gov/qanda.htm.
3 See Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, Addressing Environmental Concerns
Regarding Chilean Accession to NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 221,229 (1995).
For the purposes of this Note, I will use the terms "fast-track" or "fast-track procedures"
to refer to the accelerated review in both the 1974-1994 legislation and the rules in the
current Act. I will use the terms "trade promotion authority" or "TPA" to refer to the
accelerated review specifically implemented by the current Act.
" See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801-13
(West Supp. 2003).
See 148 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain).
6 See id. at S7789 (statement of Sen. Brownback) ("I don't think there is another thing
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negotiation process to a degree of congressional interference that did not exist under
previous fast-track procedures.
Fast-track procedures have been the source of considerable debate over the last
ten years. Free-trade advocates tout the procedures as a vital tool to enact
international free-trade agreements.7 Opponents have included both those
individuals generally opposed to free trade and those who argue that the fast-track
procedures curtail public discourse on important social issues.!
Part I of this Note recounts the historical separation of power to negotiate and
implement international trade agreements, beginning with the constitutional
demarcation of powers. Part II describes the provisions of the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2002 that affect the power distribution between the
President and Congress. Part III examines the rationale given for adopting fast-
track procedures, compares the previous fast-track procedures to the newly
implemented TPA, and examines the political reasons for the changes. Part IV
evaluates whether the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 resolves
the problems it was adopted to address.
By enacting the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Congress
usurped the constitutional authority of the President to negotiate international
treaties,9 including trade agreements. Although the House of Representatives, in
concert with the Senate, has the constitutional power to regulate trade," history has
shown that Congress is ill-suited to do so directly on an international scale. The
pressures placed on Congress by domestic interest groups are likely to impede, if
not halt, fruitful negotiations. This Note will demonstrate that Congress should
delegate to the executive branch the power to regulate trade with foreign nations
independently.
we could do in the near term for us to be able to grow this economy that would be more
important than to pass trade promotion authority. I think it is that critical a piece of
legislation. .. ."); id. at S7792 (statement of Sen. Baucus) ("[W]e believe this legislation is
vital in putting the United States on a similar playing field with agreements that are
negotiated around the world.") (quoting a letter from various Montana commerce agencies);
id. at S7775 (statement of Sen. McCain) ("Enactment of this legislation will go a long way
toward re-establishing faith and trust in the United States as a trading partner.");
Proclamation No. 7564, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,893 (May 17, 2002) ("[TPA] is vital to securing
new free trade agreements with potential negotiating partners.").
See infra text accompanying notes 107-27.
See infra text accompanying notes 134-47.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'0 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
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I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION
A. Constitutional Delegation of Powers
The Constitution divides powers dealing with foreign relations between all
three branches of government." Although the Constitution grants broad authority
to the federal government in the area of foreign affairs, it does not paint a clear line
of demarcation between powers of the Executive and the Legislative branches.' 2
Article II grants the President the power to make treaties but only with the approval
of a supermajority of the Senate. 3 Congress has the power to regulate foreign
trade, 4 including the power to "[fl]ay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises,"" 5 and the Judiciary has power within several areas of foreign affairs. 6
Based on their experiences with the Articles of Confederation, the drafters of
the Constitution recognized the need to focus the authority over foreign affairs.'
Fearing the centralization of power," however, the drafters "limit[ed] the powers
of each branch and construct[ed] checks and balances to prevent concentrations of
power."' 9 Although the formation of treaties is more of a legislative function,20 the
President was given power to negotiate because of the need to demonstrate clear
" E.g., Harold Hongju Koh & John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The
Fabric of Economics and National Security Law, 26 INT'L LAw. 715, 719-20 (1992).
" See Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to
Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 687, 688-89 (1996).
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, el. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.") The President's authority to appoint ambassadors provides power over
foreign affairs. See Carrier, supra note 12, at 689-90.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Congress shall have the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations .. .
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16 U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors . . .-
to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction .. ") (emphasis added).
17 See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 730-31 (1998).
" See Carrier, supra note 12, at 691.
'9 Paul, supra note 17, at 723.
2o See 148 CONG. REc. S 10,660 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
Until the closing days of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Framers had
intended for the Senate to have the sole authority to make treaties. And in the
Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that treaty making "will
be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive character .... "
2004]
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leadership and a unified front when dealing with other nations.2 Vesting the power
to negotiate in the President also provides a single point of contact for foreign
powers.2 The Senate was given the power to ratify treaties because, as the more
"contemplative" arm of the legislature, it was less subject to short-term interests
than the House while still directly representing the interests of the People.2 The
drafters gave Congress the power to set tariffs and to regulate commerce in order
to check the powers of the Executive.24
Although the drafters discussed the commerce power and the power to make
treaties,2" very little information is available as to how they intended to allocate the
powers of foreign commerce among the branches.26 "The well-recognized utility
of Congressional involvement in treaty and international agreement negotiation
applies with even greater force when it comes to international trade. For here, the
making of international agreements intersects with the Constitution's express grant
of authority to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations."'27
The President has the power to negotiate international treaties but does not have
the constitutional authority to regulate commerce or to determine tariffs and duties.
Congress, on the other hand, has the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations but does not have the power to negotiate international agreements directly.
Therefore the demarcation of power in the area of international trade agreements
cannot be determined directly from the Constitution.
" See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton). Another concern was that the
legislative branch would not represent the best interests of the nation as a whole, whereas the
President would place the national interests ahead of those of individual states. See Robert
Knowles, Comment, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to
Globalization, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 771 (2001) (referring to the "concerns raised by
Madison that the treaty-maker should represent the interests of the entire nation").
22 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
21 See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution,
80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 760 (2002).
24 See Carrier, supra note 12, at 693.
2S See generally 1 THEDEBATES INTHE SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERALCONSTITUTION (Jonathan Ellioted., Burt Franklin reprints, photo. reprint 1987) (2d
ed. 1836);THEFEDERALSTNo. 75 (Alexander Hamilton); JAMES MADISON, JOURNALOFTHE
FEDERAL CONVENTION (E.H. Scott ed., Books for Libraries Press 1970) (1840); 2 JAMES
MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONsTIuTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott
eds., 1987).
26 John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation ofPowers Under the
United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203,224 (1995) ("Hardly anything can be
found in the documentation relating to the drafting of the Constitution so as to glean any
intent on the separation of powers in the area of foreign commerce.").
27 148 CONG. REC. S 10,660 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
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B. Separation of Powers: Early America
After establishing its independence, the United States had a weak military and
depended on trade policies to assert itself in world politics.2" Congress
implemented these trade policies through legislation 9 and through the ratification
of commercial treaties negotiated by the President. Throughout the 1800s, the
President negotiated treaties, including trade treaties, and obtained the necessary
Senate approval. 3' The President also determined which countries would be-entitled
to "Most Favored Nation" status. 2 Congress and the President seemed to have
established a mutually beneficial distribution of power in trade policy. 3
Beginning in the 1920s, however, Congress began reasserting power over the
development of international trade policy.34 Congress began passing protectionist
legislation in response to pressure from domestic industries and agriculture." In
1930, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,36 which increased
tariffs to an average of fifty-three percent and increased the number of products that
were dutiable.3 Under Smoot-Hawley, "Congress refusedto delegate responsibility
for international trade administration and instead set every tariff level itself."38 The
United States quickly became subject to similar tariffs as other countries retaliated
against the tariff hike.39 In the mid-1930s, Congress realized that having the most
See Koh & Yoo, supra note 11, at 720.
z See Theresa Wilson, Note, Who Controls International Trade? Congressional
Delegation of the Foreign Commerce Power, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 141, 164 (1998).
o See Linarelli, supra note 26, at 208-09.
3' See id. at 208.
32 See id. at 209.
13 See id. at210.
34 See Wilson, supra note 29, at 166.
3 See id. (referring to the Tariff Act of 1922).
36 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 71-361,46 Stat. 590 (1930). The Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act was the ultimate display of U.S. protectionism, Linarelli, supra note 26,
at 210, and resulted from Congress caving to special interests. Harold Hongju Koh,
Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1194 (1986) ("Because congressional logrolling and
horsetrading contributed to every individual duty rate, Smoot-Hawley set the most
protectionist tariff levels in U.S. history.").
31 Wilson, supra note 29, at 166.
38 Koh, supra note 36, at 1194.
31 See id. Scholars have suggested that the Snioot-Hawley Tariff Act and the reactionary
increases in tariffs may have contributed to the Great Depression. See C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast
Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECoN. 1, 17 & n.62 (1994).
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political branch of the government try to set tariffs was at best inefficient" and
therefore passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.41
This Act permitted the President to reduce tariffs within guidelines set by
Congress. 2 The Act allowed the President to issue a Presidential Proclamation
enacting international agreements that lowered tariffs without any further action by
Congress.43 The Act was a significant delegation of Congress's power to set tariffs.
With each extension of the Act, however, Congress issued more guidelines, further
restricting the powers that it had delegated to the President."
C. Modern Power Distribution and Fast Track
In 1974, Congress drastically altered the U.S. approach to negotiating
international trade agreements.45 Rather than making additional changes to the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Congress passed the Trade Act of 1974, which
created the modem procedures known as the fast track.' The 1974 Act expanded
the scope of powers delegated to the President, giving the President the authority
to create international trade agreements that affected both tariffs and nontariff
barriers.47 In enacting the 1974 Act, Congress delegated to the Executive both the
power to set tariffs and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
Although the scope of the powers granted to the President was broader, the
extent of the grant was limited. Unlike in previous legislation that dealt only with
40 See Linarelli, supra note 26, at 211.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934)
(allowing President to negotiate tariff agreements with foreign nations and implement them
by Presidential Proclamation without congressional approval).
42 See id.; Linarelli, supra note 26, at 211.
43 See Linarelli, supra note 26, at 211-12 (citing Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934).
44 See Koh, supra note 36, at 1196.
45 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 143, 143-48 (1992).
46 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2191-94 (West 1974).
41 See Wilson, supra note 29, at 169-71. Nontariff barriers (NTBs) are essentially
anything other than a tariff or quota that is used to restrict trade. The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) broadly defines NTBs as "[1]aws, regulations, judicial decisions
and administrative rulings of general application ... pertaining to . . . requirements,
restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefore, or
affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection,
exhibition, processing, mixing or other use ..... General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. X, para. 1.
Examples include customs valuation, import licensing rules, subsidies, compatibility
standards, quality standards, health and safety regulations, and labeling laws. JOHN J.
JACKSON ET AL, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 411 (4th ed.
2002).
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tariffs, Congress did not give the President the ability to enact these agreements by
a simple proclamation.4" Instead, the President had to seek congressional
approval.
49
In order to facilitate the approval, the fast-track mechanism was developed,
involving specific procedures that provided for congressional review of the
agreement during the negotiation process."0 The most notable aspect of the fast-
track procedures was that Congress could only give a "thumbs-up" or "thumbs-
down" response and could not modify the text of the agreement." This power gave
the President greater credibility when negotiating international agreements because
foreign nations knew that the agreements would not be subj ect to prolonged debates
and potentially drastic changes in the hands of the U.S. Congress.
Legislationpassed during the 1980s made the fast-track procedures increasingly
complicated.53 First, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 added a requirement that the
President consult with the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee prior to giving notice of his intent to sign the agreement' 4 so
that the committees could disapprove the negotiations before formal talks even
began." The changes curtailed presidential discretion in negotiations by
"empower[ing] an ad hoc coalition of key committee members to jeopardize a
proposed [free trade agreement] that otherwise enjoyed general congressional
48 See Wilson, supra note 29, at 170 (citing Trade Act of 1974).
49 See id.
'0 See id.
51 See id. at 171; Koh, supra note 45, at 147; Linarelli, supra note 26, at 219.
52 See Koh, supra note 36, at 1200-03.
Before fast track, presidents had been embarrassed by the refusal of Congress to
implement negotiated agreements. After Woodrow Wilson made a point of excluding the
Senate from negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Senate repeatedly refused to ratify
the agreement. See Senator Thad Cochran, The James McClure Memorial Lecture in Law
Delivered at the University of Mississippi School of Law (Oct. 13, 1997), in 67 MiSs. LJ.
383, 391-92 (1997); Ren6e Lettow Lemer, International Pressure to Harmonize: The US.
Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 281 n.24 (2001).
Congress refused to approve the modifications to the GATT resulting from the Kennedy
Round, which would have repealed the American Selling Price method of customs valuation.
See Koh, supra note 36, at 1199. "The European parties to the agreement extended the
deadline for acceptance several times, but finally refused to wait any longer, causing the
agreement to lapse." Id. at 1200 n.24.
" See, e.g., Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948; Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (extending fast
track).
14 See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948.
" See Koh, supra note 45, at 149.
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support . ...*" Congress was effectively retaining a larger share of its
constitutional authority over the regulation of international trade.
57
In 1988, Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988.5' The Act further "enhance[d] Congress's power in two respects: by
reserving for either house the power to block extension of the Fast Track authority
past the original expiration date and for both houses to derail already authorized
agreements from the Fast Track."59 In addition to the House Ways and Means and
the Senate Finance Committees, the House Rules Committee was given the power
to "derail" an extension of fast track.6' The Act extended the fast-track procedures
for only three years.6
56 Id. at 150.
The 1984 Act's modified Fast Track procedure not only enhanced congressional
influence over the negotiation of trade agreements, it dramatically expanded the
influence of the gatekeeper committees [House Ways and Means Committee and
Senate Finance Committee] vis-a-vis the rest of Congress. In effect, the modified
Fast Track procedure afforded Congress three bites at the apple. Under the
committee gatekeeping procedure, a majority vote of either key committee could
"derail" a presidential proposal from the Fast Track - and in many cases,
effectively kill it - thereby giving the Executive strong incentives to consult
with the committee's members at each step of the process. Thus, the statutory
requirement of a sixty-day prenegotiation consultation period with the two
committees secured their involvement in the Canada FTA negotiations months
before formal talks began and allowed them to extract concessions from the
President as a condition of letting negotiations proceed. Second, the
Administration's awareness that any negotiated agreement would ultimately
return to the same committees for subsequent approval promoted continuing
consultation as the agreement evolved. Third and finally, either house retained
the option to vote down the fully negotiated agreement even after its discharge
from committee.
Id. at 149.
17 Id. at 150.
" Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
'9 Koh, supra note 45, at 151.
60 Seeid. (referring to the 1988 Act§ 1103(b)(5)(A)-(B)). Section 1103(b)(5)(A) defines
the term "extension disapproval resolution" as:
a resolution of either House of the Congress... [that] disapproves the request
of the President for the extension... of the [fast-track] provisions to any
implementing bill submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into
under section 1102(b) or (c) of such Act after May 31, 1991, because sufficient
tangible progress has not been made in trade negotiations.
Section 1 103(b)(5)(B) provides that extension disapproval resolutions "may be introduced
in either House of the Congress by any member of such House [and] shall be jointly referred,
in the House of Representatives, to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee
on Rules."
61 See Taylor, supra note 39, at 31:
The President's agreements were only to receive fast track treatment if they were
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The negotiation of the United States-Canada free-trade agreement occurred
under the 1984 and 1988 versions of fast-track procedures. During those
negotiations, the reintroduction of Congress into the process resulted in exactly the
type of problems that had existed prior to fast track. For example, the maritime
industry sought a "Senate resolution denying the Fast Track to any bill that would
have implemented maritime provisions of the FTA requiring national treatment. 62
Rather than lose a needed trade agreement, Canada and the President agreed to
leave maritime provisions out of the FTA "in exchange for an agreement by the
Senate sponsors to drop their Fast Track denying resolution." 63
In 1991, President Bush requested an extension of fast-track authority in order
to complete the Uruguay Round negotiations and to pursue the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).6' The ensuing debate in Congress resulted in a
two-year extension of fast track, subject to a series of additional conditions for the
negotiation of the NAFTA.65 The congressional debate revealed waning support for
fast track 6 and foreshadowed the problems that President Clinton would face in
obtaining an additional extension to fast track.
Due to the changes in fast-track procedures, lobbyists began to influence trade
negotiations through legislators, making international trade agreements subject to
domestic interest groups.67 The negotiation of the NAFTA became a battleground
entered into before June 1, 1991. For agreements entered into after May 31,
1991, but before June 1, 1993, fast track was available only if the President
requested an extension of negotiating authority and neither house adopted an
extension disapproval resolution before June 1, 1991.
62 Koh, supra note 45, at 152.
63 Id.
Taylor, supra note 39, at 33-34. NAFTA creates a free-trade area including the United
States, Canada and Mexico.
6 See id. at 48-51.
See id. at 36-42. Professor Taylor notes:
Because international trade policy making by means of fast track was designed
as a power-sharing measure, this loss of congressional power was perceived to
be a gain for the President. Most fast track opponents were not concerned that
the Executive branch was not fulfilling its statutory obligations - such as
consulting with Congress - but rather, that the President had too much control
over the content of international trade agreements.
Id. at 38-39 (footnotes omitted). See also Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Belo, The Fast Track
Debate: A Prescription for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAw. 183, 192 (1992). Opponents in
Congress "decried the 'abrogation,' 'abdication,' 'surrender,' or 'relinquish[ment]' of
congressional power, prerogatives, and responsibilities." Id. (alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted).
67 See Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements,
5 FLA. INT'LL.J. 471, 481 (1990).
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for special interests." After the antagonistic debates over the enactment of
NAFTA, Congress refused to extend fast-track as requested by President Clinton.
69
D. Recent Developments
Despite repeated attempts by President Clinton to renew fast track, the existing
fast-track legislation expired in 1994.70 For the first time in fifty years, the
Executive branch was left without the authority to enter into international trade
agreements except through the creation of treaties subject to the approval of the
Senate. From 1994 until August 2002, Congress refused to grant the executive
branch the power to enter directly into international trade agreements.7'
Both President Clinton and President Bush lobbied extensively to persuade
Congress to grant some authority to the Executive to create trade agreements.72
President Bush argued that "the lack of [trade promotion authority] has placed
American exporters at a disadvantage,"73 pointing out that during the eight years
without presidential trade promotion authority the United States failed to pursue
68 See Robert F. Housman & Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental
Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A LookBack and a Look Ahead,
8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719, 724 (1993); see also Taylor, supra note 39, at 34-35.
" See Robert F. Housman, The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future
Western Hemisphere TradeLiberalization Efforts, 10 CONN. J. INT'LL. 301,310-14 (1995).
70 Id. at 311-13:
Initially, the [Clinton) administration sought a virtually unfettered extension of
fast-track authority for a seven year period.... This first proposal was met with
immediate and unified opposition .... [T]his first surge of opposition amounted
to a game of "policy chicken."
Facing continuing opposition, the administration floated a second fast-track
proposal .... Republicans and the business community once again came out
against this new proposal.... [T]he administration dropped its second fast-track
proposal and floated in its place yet another proposal.... While the third
proposal garnered quick support from opponents of the prior two proposals, it
did not fare well [with other groups]. The administration rushed to counter this
opposition, relying heavily on the argument that the extension of fast-track was
vital to give the administration credibility.... In the end, the Uruguay Round
bill went forward without any fast-track extension.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
" See John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, U.S. Enacts New "Fast-Track" Trade Bill, 8
INT'L L. UPDATE 126 (2002).
72 See Sek, supra note 1 (detailing multiple proposals and speeches made by Clinton and
Bush requesting renewal of fast-track authority); Clinton Makes Fast Track Plea To
Congress, (Nov. 5, 1997), at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/l1/05/trade/ (last
visited Mar. 4, 2003); David Schepp, Bush Wants More Trade Powers, BBC NEws ONLINE
(Mar. 23, 2001), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1238717.stm.
13 See Approved Trade Bill Grants President Broad Negotiating Authority, 44 No. 30
GOv'T CONTRACTOR, Aug. 14, 2002.
[Vol. 12:979
FAST TRACK FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
free trade agreements. 4 Finally, in August 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (Trade Act of 2002)," which included
revised fast-track procedures under the new label "trade promotion authority."76
H. THE BIPARTISAN TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY ACT OF 2002
A. Distribution of Powers
The Trade Act of 2002 was billed as "establish[ing] a partnership of equals. It
recognizes that Congress's constitutional authority to regulate foreign trade and the
President's constitutional authority to negotiate with foreign nations are
interdependent. It requires a working relationship that reflects that
interdependence."" The purpose of the Act was to make another attempt to resolve
the ambiguity in the constitutional separation of powers in the area of international
trade.
Congress was determined to retain its constitutional authority, while allowing
the President to perform his role as a negotiator.7 Congress, however, intended for
the new Act to allow Congress to keep a closer watch on the President.79 In
addition to providing strict negotiating objectives to the President, Congress
reserved the right to veto a negotiated agreement.8"
The President's power is limited by specific guidelines and concerns identified
by Congress. The President's negotiations may address only the issues identified
by Congress in the statute and must follow specific guidelines.8" Authorization to
negotiate is granted if the President determines that foreign trade is "unduly
burden[ed] and restrict[ed]" and "the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives
74 Proclamation No. 7564, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,893 (2002). In the proclamation President
Bush notes, "[T]here are about 150 free trade agreements in effect worldwide, nearly 25
percent of which involve countries in the Western Hemisphere. The United States is a party
to only three of these pacts." Id.
71 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801-13 (West Supp. 2003).
76 Trade Act of 2002 § 3804 (detailing the new fast-track procedures).
17 148 CONG. REC. S10,661 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
78 See 148 CONG. REc. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus) ("This
will give Congress a chance to affect the outcome of the negotiations well before they
occur.").
79 148 CONG. REc. S10,660 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus)
("Indeed, the Trade Act of 2002 contemplates an even closer working relationship between
Congress and the Administration ....").
'0 See Trade Act of 2002 § 3805(b). If the agreement negotiated by the administration
does not meet the congressional requirements, "there are ways that either House of Congress
can derail a trade agreement." 148 CONG. REC. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Baucus) (referring to Trade Act of 2002 § 3805(b)).
81 Trade Act of 2002 section 3803 provides the authorization for the President to
negotiate a trade agreement with a foreign country regarding tariff and/or nontariff barriers
and the guidelines he must follow.
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of [the Trade Act of 2002] will be promoted" by the negotiations.8 2 The Act states
five additional limitations on the negotiation of agreements regarding tariff
barriers. 3 Negotiation of agreements regarding nontariff barriers are subject to the
objectives provided in section 3802 of the Act, the limitations provided in section
3803(b)(3), and the consultations and notice required by section 3804.84
Section 3802 details the trade negotiating objectives. There are nine broad
objectives, that include not only promotion of free trade, but also promotion of
environmental and labor standards.8 " Specific negotiating objectives are provided
in the areas of "trade barriers and distortions" and "trade in services," 6 "foreign
investment,"8.7 "transparency,"" "improvement of the WTO and multilateral trade
agreements,"8 9 "regulatory practices" and "reciprocal trade in agriculture,"9
"dispute settlement and enforcement,"' "trade remedy laws," ' and several others.
82 Trade Act of 2002 § 3803.
" Id. § 3803(a). Limitations on modifications to tariff barriers primarily set minimums
for rate of duty reductions. See id.
" Id. § 3803(b) (limiting agreements as provided in sections 3802 and 3804). The
President's actions are considerably more restricted under the Trade Act of 2002 than under
previous legislation. Compare Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2495 (1974) and
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat. 1107 with
Trade Act of 2002, §§ 3801-13.
" Trade Act of 2002 § 3802(a). This is a marked shift from prior legislation, which did
not include provisions catering to special interest groups. The inclusion of environmental and
labor goals was the issue that blocked consensus in efforts to renew trade promotion authority
between 1994 and 2002. See Housman, supra note 69, at 310-14.
86 Trade Act of2002 § 3802(b)(1)-(2). These provisions encourage negotiations with the
basic goal of promoting free trade by removing barriers to trade in the areas of goods and
services.
87 Id. § 3802(b)(3). This provision provides detailed explanations of eight types of
concessions (with subcategories) that Congress wants the President to pursue in agreements.
88 Id. § 3802(b)(5). Transparency refers to the accessibility ofinformation regarding trade
rules, regulations, policies, and practices. See GATT, supra note 47, art. X, available at
http://www.wto.orgfenglish/docs-e/legaLe/gatt47- 01_e.htm. For more information
regarding transparency in the context of trade negotiations, see Luis Miguel Diaz & Nancy
A. Oretskin, Mediation Furthers The Principles Of Transparency and Cooperation to Solve
Disputes in The NAFTA Free Trade Area, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 73-75 (2001).
89 Trade Act of 2002 § 3802(b)(7). Congress's objectives for improving the WTO and
multilateral trade agreements are, inter alia, "to achieve full implementation and extend the
coverage ... to products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately covered."
9 Id. § 3802(b)(8), (10).
9' Id. § 3802(b)(12). Congress was particularly concerned that the President attempt to
address the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process in future
negotiations. Using strongly worded language criticizing recent WTO dispute settlement
decisions, Congress stated:
Support for continued trade expansion requires that dispute settlement
procedures under international trade agreements not add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in such agreements. Therefore -
(A) the recent pattern of decisions by dispute settlement panels of the WTO and
[Vol. 12:979
FAST TRACK FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
The President must notify Congress prior to initiating negotiations, in order for
the final negotiated agreement to be eligible for TPA.93 The President must also
consult Congress regarding the negotiations "before and after submission of the
notice."94 Section 3804 also provides that the President must make specific
determinations and special consultations with Congress in the areas of agriculture
and textiles.95
B. Oversight
In order to ensure that the President follows the guidelines laid out by Congress,
the Trade Act of 2002 creates a Congressional Oversight Group (COG) composed
of members of Congress to provide direct participation and oversight to trade
negotiations initiated under the Act.96 The membership of the COG includes four
members of the House Committee on Ways and Means, four members of the Senate
Committee on Finance, and members of the committees of the House and Senate
"which would have... jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a [sic] trade
agreement negotiations . . . ."' The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) must
accredit each member of the COG as an official advisor to the U.S. delegation in
the Appellate Body to impose obiigations and restrictions on the use of
antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures. . . has raised concerns;
and
(B) the Congress is concerned that dispute settlement panels of the WTO and the
Appellate Body appropriately apply the standard of review. . . to provide
deference to a permissible interpretation by aWTO member ofprovisions of that
Agreement, and to the evaluation by a WTO member of the facts where that
evaluation is unbiased and objective and the establishment of the facts is proper.
Id. § 3801(3). "[T]he Administration is directed to develop a strategy to counter or reverse
this problem, or lose fast track." 148 CONG. REc. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement
of Sen. Baucus). The Trade Act of 2002 identifies concerns regarding dispute settlement
procedures in the Congressional findings section, § 3801(3), and in the section on principal
trade negotiating objectives, Id. § 3802(b)(12).
9 Id. § 3802(b)(14). The issue of protecting U.S. trade remedy laws was addressed
multiple times in the Act, including the congressional findings and the trade negotiating
objectives. See 148 CONG. REC. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus)
(stating that the Trade Act of 2002 "contains a principal negotiating objective directing
negotiators not to undermine U.S. trade laws"). Protection of the trade laws is an essential
element of any negotiations. Id. at S7772 (statement of Sen. Craig) ("Sixty-two Senators said:
Do not negotiate away our trade laws, or suffer the consequence.").
9' Id. § 3804(a).
94 Id. § 3804.
" Id. § 3804(b)-(c).
96 See id. § 3807.
9' Id. § 3807(a)(2)-(3).
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negotiations for any trade agreement under the Act.98 The COG was created "to
provide an additional consultative mechanism for Members of Congress and to
provide advice to the [USTR] on trade negotiations."
In order to enact an international trade agreement using the TPA procedures, the
President must first consult with the Senate Committee on Finance, the House
Committee on Ways and Means, and the COG. °° The President must then provide
written notice to Congress of his intention to enter into negotiations.'' The notice
must include the date that negotiations are scheduled to begin, the specific
objectives for the negotiations, and whether the President seeks to create a new
agreement or modify an existing agreement.'02
Six months before signing an agreement, the President must "send a report to
Congress... that lays out what he plans to do with respect to [U.S.] trade laws."''
At that time, Congress reviews the proposed agreement. The Trade Act of 2002
"provides for a resolution process where Congress can specifically fimd that the
proposed changes are 'inconsistent' with the negotiating objectives."''
Congress defends the complexity of the legislation as a necessary evil. "The
negotiating objectives and procedures ... represent a very careful substantive and
political balance on some very complex and difficult issues such as investment,
labor and the environment, and the relationship between Congress and the
Executive branch during international trade negotiations."'0 5 The Trade Act of
2002 ultimately places much more stringent limitations on the President's ability
to negotiate effectively with foreign nations than previous fast-track legislation
had. 106
" See id. § 3807(a)(4). Without accreditation, congressional representatives would be
bystanders and would not be permitted to participate directly in negotiations. As accredited
representatives, the members of the COG have the authority to act on behalf of the United
States in negotiations.
" 148 CONG. REC. S9108 (daily ed. Sept. 24,2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley);see also
id. § 3807(a)(4). The purpose of the COG is "to provide advice to the Trade Representative
regarding the formulation of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, the
development of the applicable trade agreement, and compliance and enforcement of the
negotiated commitments under the trade agreement." Id.
'0' Id. § 3804(a)(2).
'0' Id. § 3804(a)(1) (requiring that written notice be provided at least ninety days prior to
the commencement of negotiations).
102 Id.
'03 148 CONG. REC. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (referring
to section 3804(a)(3)).
'04 Id. (setting limitations on trade authorities procedures § 3805(b)).
"3d 148 CONG. REc. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24,2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
106 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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lIl. FREE TRADE, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY, AND THE TRADE ACT OF 2002
Free trade benefits society by reducing consumer prices and expanding
consumer options. 07 International trade agreements focus on removing or reducing
barriers to trade. Barriers to free trade include not only "taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures,""' but also any "internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws,
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative
regulations... applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection
to domestic production."' 9
Barriers to trade are imposed primarily to protect a domestic industry that
cannot produce a good or service as efficiently as a foreign industry can.' 0 The
theory of comparative advantage is that countries should not produce items that they
can buy from other countries that produce those items more efficiently."' This
theory is an essential element of the rationale to encourage free trade.12
Ill See Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17
ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 257, 272 (2000).
Free trade increases opportunities to obtain goods and services otherwise
unavailable in the importing country. Free trade provides cheaper and better
quality products to importing nations; reciprocity allows importing nations to
pay for their imports by the revenue gained from exports; trade develops
international cooperation and maintains political alliances with trading partners;
trade increases competition and spurs increased quality of domestic goods and
services; trade infuses capital into the developing countries, raises their standard
of living, creates jobs for the otherwise unemployed, and enables the developing
nations to compete in the international trade arena.
Id.; see also Nathan Hale, The American System or the Effects of High Duties on Imports
(1828), reprinted in 1 FREE TRADE AND PROTECTIONISM IN AMERICA: 1822-1890, at 152
(Lars Magnusson ed., 2000) (arguing that high taxes on foreign goods do not promote
domestic industry).
"0s GATT, supra note 47, art. Xl, § 1.
101 Id. art. II, § 1.
" See generally 4 FREE TRADE AND PROTECTIONISM IN AMERICA: 1822-1890 (Lars
Magnusson ed., 2000). Other reasons for barriers to trade include, inter alia, enhancing
national security, promoting religious or aesthetic goals, and preserving or encouraging a
specific type of economic activity. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM
19-24 (2d ed. 1997).
" ' "Trade allows countries to concentrate on what they can do best. No two countries are
exactly alike in natural resources, climate or work force. Those differences give each country
a 'comparative advantage' over the others in some products." JACKSON, supra note 110, at
12 (quoting BILL BRADLEY & FRITz LEUTWILER, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE:
PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 23 (1985)). For a more detailed discussion of the theory of
comparative advantage, see id. at 14-18.
112 See id. at 11-12.
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Reducing or removing barriers encourages international trade. 3 "[T]he lower
the barriers between the nations, the less obstructions to trade, the more business
that will be conducted .... ,, 4 Trade promotion authority is intended to facilitate
the implementation of international trade agreements in order to promote free trade
and to act as a stimulus for the economy." 5 Trade promotion authority makes it
possible for Congress and the President "to work together to open new markets for
American exports, set fair rules of conduct for U.S. investors overseas, and help
raise the standard of living for millions of people around the world."
'
"
16
Despite the many changes to previous fast-track legislation, the purpose was
always "to give the administration the tools it need[ed] to liberalize trade and create
new opportunities for America's farmers, ranchers and workers;" the new TPA
continues to pursue the same goal." 7 "By empowering the President to negotiate
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, TPA will enable the President to
eliminate trade barriers, reduce tariffs, and open foreign markets to American goods
and services.'.
To facilitate the reduction of barriers, the President must have credibility when
negotiating. Without TPA, foreign countries know that the President does not have
the authority to enact the agreements that he is negotiating.'' Trade promotion
authority gives the President credibility at the international negotiating table. 20
113 Id.
"4 Economic Integration Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 89 (statement of panelist
Manny A. Mencia, Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Enterprise Florida, Inc.,
Division of International Trade and Economic Development).
I" See 148 CONG. REC. S7789 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Brownback).
The current economic decline has been blamed on the lack of TPA over the last eight years.
Terese Carr, Comment, The Executive Trade Promotion Authority and International
Environmental Review in the Twenty-First Century, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 141, 159 (2002)
("[T]he U.S. is party to only three of the 131 international trade agreements currently in
effect. The result: U.S. exports have suffered, and U.S. jobs continue to be exported
abroad .... .") (quoting Richard S. Dunham, How Bush Should Push Trade, Bus. WK.
ONLINE, Aug. 12, 2002, available at 2002 WL 5146824).
116 148 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
"17 Id. at S9108.
"1 See 148 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain).
"9 Cf. Koh, supra note 45, at 148 (asserting that fast-track procedures "bolstered the
Executive Branch's negotiating credibility").
"o 148 CoNG. REc. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (stating
that the TPA "will make it easier for the President to negotiate strong trade agreements").
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: A TIMETABLE FOR GLOBAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS, athttp://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/wwwh0 112040 l.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2003) (quoting Pascal Lamy, European Union Commissioner for Trade, following
the Doha launch of global negotiations: "If [President Bush] doesn't get [trade promotion]
authority fairly quickly, then no one will negotiate. Useful negotiations won't be able to
commence.").
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Foreign nations have more reason to believe that the President has the ability to
enact the promised changes when he is negotiating under the authority of TPA." I
In addition to enhancing credibility in negotiations, Congress was concerned
with putting the United States back into a leadership position in international
trade.122 By taking the lead in international trade, the United States can exert
greater influence on the course of negotiations. 13 "[Congressional] proposals will
be propelled with added force" as a result of the TPA legislation.' 24 The executive
branch also advocated TPA in order to "take the offense on America's trade
negotiating agenda."'
' 25
During the congressional hearings regarding the Act, legislators gave a variety
of other reasons in support of granting TPA to the President. For example, the Act
would "reestablish[] the traditional partnership on trade between the Congress and
the Executive branch."'2 6 Furthermore, the procedures ensure that the President
remains accountable when exercising powers constitutionally granted to Congress
"because Congress still participates in drafting and adoption of the implementing
legislation.'
' 27
121 Samuel C. Straight, GAYTTandNAFTA: MarryingEffectiveDispute Settlement and the
Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DuKE L.J. 216, 236 (1995) (stating that TPA "provides
the President with flexibility and credibility when negotiating trade agreements because
trading partners have greater confidence that Congress will not unravel hard-won trade
agreements").
' 148 CONG. REC. S7772 (daily ed. Aug. 1,2002) (statement of'Sen. Grassley) ("Nations
around the world are waiting for.., the United States to reestablish its leadership that we
haven't had for 9 years. I hope we will not let them down."). During the eight years without
TPA, the rest of the world actively pursued agreements liberalizing trade. "Mexico has made
bilateral trade agreements with everybody... while we have been sitting here arguing about
fast-track.... So Mexico is putting pressure on all of us. And Chile is doing the same thing."
Economic Integration Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 94 (statement of panelist Kenneth
H. "Buddy" MacKay).
123 See Extraterritorial Income Laws and US. Competitiveness: Hearing Before the
Senate Fin. Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Income Laws]
(statement of Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative); see also 148 CONG. REC.
S7775 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain) (stating that enactment of the
Trade Act of 2002 will reestablish a strong negotiating role for the United States).
124 Extraterritorial Income Laws, supra note 123 (statement of Robert B. Zoellick)
(referring to a U.S. "proposal in the global Doha WTO negotiations to liberalize the world
agricultural trade" made in July 2002).
' Id. (statement of Robert B. Zoellick).
126 148 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(speaking in favor of the Trade Act of 2002 Conference Report). "[T]he history of
Congressional involvement in the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements
has its roots in the very origins of our Nation." 148 CONG. REC. S 10,660 (daily ed. Oct. 17,
2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
127 Straight, supra note 121, at 236.
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Despite the recognition of the loss of international negotiating power, Congress
was slow to delegate power to the President. The new TPA was granted "only after
nearly 10 years of careful consideration and negotiation of terms, and close votes
in the Senate and House. 128 Congress granted TPA to the President with strong
reservations and jealously guarded its power, refusing to delegate any more than
necessary. The Trade Act of 2002 does "not give the President a blank check. Far
from it."' 29
Congress retained far more control over the negotiation of international trade
agreements than it had in previous legislation. Although Congress claimed to
"provide the President with the flexibility that he needs to negotiate strong
international trade agreements while maintaining [its own] constitutional role over
U.S. trade policy,"'30 it still acknowledged that the Act is "much stronger than
previous fast-track bills."'31
The "all or nothing" methodology of fast-track procedures reduces the pressure
on representatives by special-interest groups.'32 Despite that, Congress included a
variety of restrictions in the Act designed to appease special-interest groups. As a
result, "[i]t is far from clear.., whether the President will receive the bipartisan
support he needs to use the trade promotion authority effectively.' 3 3
Opponents of TPA comprise a diverse cross-section of society.13 4
Environmental groups,'3 labor groups'36 and even religious groups M have spoken
"28 Editorial, Chile and US.: Promising Partner with a Troubled Past, PITrsBURGH POST-
GAZETIE, Oct. 1, 2002, at 22.
29 148 CONG. REC. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (promoting
the Trade Act of 2002 conference report).
'0 148 CONG. REC. S7771 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
'I' Id. at S7768 (statement of Sen. Baucus).
132 Brian J. Schoenborn, Note, Public Participation in Trade Negotiations: Open
Agreements, Openly ArrivedAt?, 4 MINN. J. GLOBALTRADE 103, 138 (1995) ("For the most
part, fast-track was a successful attempt at reducing the special interest politics which often
plague the federal government.").
' Carr, supra note 115, at 143.
114 See Steve Charnovitz, No TimeforNEPA: Trade Agreements on a Fast Track, 3 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 195, 197 (1994). The recent trend toward protectionism has been labeled
"New Protectionism." Unlike old protectionism, with which big business protected its
interests, new protectionism "seeks to protectpublic interests, like health or the environment
or safety standards or reduction of poverty." Id.
35 Letter from the Center for International Environmental Law, to House of
Representatives, Reject the Trade Promotion Act of 2001 (June 27, 2001), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Tae/TradeCrane.html (also signed by six other environmental
organizations); Reed McManus, Ten Reasons to Oppose "Fast Track", SIERRA MAGAZINE,
Mar./Apr. 2002, athttp://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200205/lol3.asp. The argument that free
trade is harmful to the environment is relatively new. See Charnovitz, supra note 134, at
196-97. Environmentalists argue that free trade negatively impacts the environment in many
ways. For example: "Free trade may spur economic development. Nations that develop
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out in opposition to TPA. These groups argue that TPA is not necessary. As
evidence, they point out that few agreements have been enacted under similar
legislation.' Only five international trade agreements were ever enacted using the
fast-track procedures of previous legislation.
39
This argument ignores the fact that all but one international trade agreement in
effect for the United States were passed using the fast-track process. 40 In addition,
countries that had previously indicated an interest in negotiating free-trade
agreements with the United States abandoned those plans after fast track expired in
1994.' 41 Since the Trade Act of 2002 was passed, those countries have again
expressed a willingness to begin negotiations toward a free-trade agreement with
the United States. 42
without sufficient environmental controls may suffer from increased pollution and depleted
natural resources.... Also, natural resources are finite. A nation that squanders natural
resources by failing to recycle or conserve could conceivably use up resources needed by
other nations." Block & Hermp, supra note 3, at 239.
136 See AM. FED'N OF LABOR& CONGRESS OFINDUS. ORG. (AFL-CIO), STOP FTAA- IT'S
THE WRONG CHOICE, at http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/ftaamaincfin;
see also Housman & Orbuch, supra note 68, at 759 (claiming the primary concern of
American labor groups is the fear that "cheaper imported products... will cause job loss in
the United States").
137 See Letter from Interfaith Working Group on Trade & Investment, to Congress (Oct.
16,2001), available athttp://www.mcc.org/us/globalization/partners/trade.html (arguing that
free trade must be pursued subject to "moral principles" and opposing H.R. 3005 which
granted TPA); see also GEN. BD. OF CHURCH &SOC'Y, UNrrED MErHODIST SOCIAL AGENCY
CALLS FOR TRADE LEGISLATION THAT BENEFITS COMMON GOOD, at
http://www.umc-gbcs.org/news/viewsnews/php?newsld= 181 (Oct. 5,2001).
". 148 CONG. REC. S7779 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hollings) ("You
will find, in essence, five trade agreements as a result of fast track, and thereafter some 200
agreements without fast track. The contention that you can't get an agreement unless you
have fast track is totally absurd.").
'9 See LAEL BRAINARD & HAL SHAPIRO, BROOKINGS INST., FAST TRACK TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY: A PRIMER AND A PRESCRIFION FOR PROGRESS (2001), available
at http://www.brook.edu/conm/policybriefs/pb9l.htm; Taylor, supra note 39, at 13 n.49:
These agreements are: the Tokyo Round of the GATT in the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979; the U.S.-Israel FTA in the United States-Israel Free Trade Area
Implementation Act of 1985; the U.S.-Canada FTA in the United States-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988; the NAFTA in the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act; and most recently, the
Uruguay Round of the GATT.
See also JOHN SWEENEY, THE HERITAGE FOUND., EXECUTnVE MEMORANDUM: FAST-TRACK
NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY: THE FACTS (1998), available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/TradeandForeignAid/em549.cfin.
140 See Carr, supra note 115, at 148-49.
141 See id.
142 See id.
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Opponents also argue that TPA is "undemocratic"'" and violates the power
structure created in the Constitution.'" They argue that the drafters of the
Constitution intentionally separated the authority to negotiate international
agreements and the power to implement the agreements. ' Additionally, they argue
that the drafters intentionally made Congress solely responsible for regulating
commerce. '" Therefore, the delegation of that authority to the President is
unconstitutional. "'
Congress is permitted to delegate its power, however. 48 The "separation-of-
powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent
Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.', 149 The standard
for determining whether delegation of Congressional power to the Executive is
constitutional rests on the "intelligible principle standard."'"5 The courts have
recognized that Congress must be permitted to delegate some of its powers in order
to be able to function."' The standard is relatively broad because "in our
' Housman & Orbuch, supra note 68, at 724. For a critical analysis of the reasons why
fast track is not undemocratic, see Koh, supra note 45, at 161-71. Some supporters of fast
track go so far as to suggest that fast track promotes democracy. E.g., F. Amanda DeBusk,
Mapping the Landscape: Perspectives on the Implementation of Free Trade Agreements, 2
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 141, 141 (2001).
'4 See Paul, supra note 17, at 723 (arguing that the various mechanisms used to bypass
the advice and consent procedures of Article II, including fast track, "frustrate[]
representative government").
' See, e.g., Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States
Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631 (1994) (opposing fast-track legislation); see also
148 CONG. REC. S7789-90 (statement of Sen. Byrd). See generally Paul, supra note 17, at
722-37.
'4 139 CONG. REc. S8322 (daily ed. June 30, 1993) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
("Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives to Congress alone the right and responsibility
to regulate foreign commerce.").
14' Holmer & Bello, supra note 66, at 192 n.57 (quoting two members of the House of
Representatives who claimed fast track was unconstitutional).
14 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Cargo of Brig Aurora, Bum Side v. United States, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1721 (2002) (arguing that "there is no
such nondelegation doctrine: A statutory grant of authority to the executive branch or other
agents never effects a delegation of legislative power. Agents acting within the terms of such
a statutory grant are exercising executive power, not legislative power.").
4 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
0 Linarelli, supra note 26, at 206 n.8. The intelligible-principle standard is restated in
Mistretta: "So long as Congress 'shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."' 488 U.S.
at 672 (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409) (alteration in original).
1'5 See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
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increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives."' The Trade Act of 2002 and the previous fast-
track legislation all clearly provided sufficient guidance to demonstrate that
Congress had provided an intelligible principle for the executive branch to carry out
its delegated tasks.
President Bush has specifically indicated that he will use the Trade Act of 2002
to negotiate the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and free-trade
agreements with Chile, Singapore, and Morocco. ' The trade agreement with Chile
could potentially be the first legislation passed under the new TPA" with "the
remainder of the hemisphere not far behind.""' President Bush promoted the TPA
152 Id.
' Notification to the Congress of Trade Negotiations, Memorandum for the USTR, 67
Fed. Reg. 62,163 (Oct. 1,2002). The memorandum instructed the USTR to notify Congress
of the President's intent to "enter into negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement with the
Kingdom of Morocco and a Free Trade Agreement with Central American Countries"
pursuant to the Trade Act of 2002. Id. The memorandum also instructed the USTR to notify
Congress of the "ongoing negotiations on Free Trade Agreements with the Republic of
Singapore and the Republic of Chile, negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area for the
Americas, and negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization." Id.
" Editorial, Chile and US, supra note 128 (suggesting that if U.S.-Chilean negotiations
reach a successful conclusion and "the new trade promotion authority process [works]
smoothly," Congress could approve the new agreement early in 2003); accord John O'Leary,
Editorial, Talks with Chile Resume at Crucial Moment, S. FL. SUN-SEIrNEl, Sept. 24, 2002,
at A15 ("Chile tops the Washington trade agenda now. Chile has earned the right to be our
first free-trade partner in South America.").
Negotiations with Chile have been on hold since fast track authority was lost in 1994.
See Economic Integration Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 94 (statement of panelist
Kenneth H. "Buddy" MacKay, Special Envoy for the Americas in the Executive Office of
the President under President Clinton).
President Clinton was unsuccessful in obtaining fast-track negotiating authority
for trade negotiations with Chile in August of 1994. Several Congressmen
staunchly opposed linking labor and environmental issues with trade agreements.
On September 13, 1994, when the Clinton administration officially announced
it was withdrawing its plan to seek fast-track negotiating authority from
Congress, it looked as though a U.S.-Chile free trade agreement would be
delayed until at least the beginning of 1995. But U.S. Trade representative
Mickey Kantor reassured Chilean government officials once again that the
United States remained "firmly committed" to negotiating a free trade deal with
Chile.
Kevin M. Jordan, Intellectual Property Under NAFTA: Is Chile Up to the Challenge?, 2
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 367, 370 (1995) (citations omitted). Despite such reassurances,
a free-trade agreement with Chile has not been forthcoming. See Economic Integration Panel
Discussion, supra note 1, at 94 (statement of panelist Kenneth H. "Buddy" MacKay).
'5 O'Leary, supra note 154 ("[T]he focus on free trade already is moving from Chile to
the Americas.").
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as a "critical step for U.S. economic growth,""' 6 emphasizing that other countries
had implemented numerous trade agreements while the U.S. was left without an
effective means to negotiate' 57 President Bush, therefore, has begun an aggressive
campaign to initiate negotiations for international trade agreements under the new
Trade Act of 2002."'
IV. TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY AS A SOLUTION
Congress's refusal to enact fast-track or trade promotion authority legislation
between 1994 and 2002 indicates legislators' unease with the delegation of
international trade regulation authority.'59 In enacting the Trade Act of 2002,
Congress delegated some power to the executive branch; " however, it attached so
many strings that the result is a piece of legislation that gives lip service to the goals
of fast track. The Trade Act of 2002 grants very little power to the President,
allowing Congress to retain ultimate control and discretion over all trade
agreements. The Trade Act of 2002 "makes Congress a full partner in trade
[negotiations] by laying out negotiating objectives on a number of topics and
creating a structure for consultations.''
Congress's reluctance to delegate the authority to enact trade agreements is
understandable. Members of Congress are under considerable pressure from a wide
variety of special-interest groups to protect American business interests. Free trade
stimulates efficient sectors of the economy, but inefficient sectors suffer. ' 2 No
individual wants to be forced out of business in the interest of free trade. Despite
" ProclamationNo. 7564, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,893 (May 17, 2002).
157 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Trade Act Of 2002 (Aug.
6, 2002), available at http://www.tpa.gov/WH-Pres-TPA-signing.htm.
With trade promotion authority, the trade agreements I negotiate will have an up-
or-down vote in Congress, giving other countries the confidence to negotiate
with us. Five Presidents before me had this advantage, but since the authority
elapsed in 1994, other nations and regions have pursued new trade agreements
while America's trade policy was stuck in park.
With each passing day, America has lost trading opportunities, and the jobs
and earnings that go with them. Starting now, America is back at the bargaining
table in full force.
Id.
's' O'Leary, supra note 154.
159 See Holmer & Bello, supra note 66, at 192-93 (explaining the positions of some fast-
track opponents).
'6 See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801-13
(West Supp. 2003).
161 148 CONG. REc. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
'62 148 CONG. REc. S7775 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("Are
there people who are hurt by this free and open trade? Absolutely.").
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that, it is the duty of Congress to protect the interests of the United States.163 By
relinquishing the power to regulate commerce to the President, Congress absolves
itself of responsibility for the final negotiated agreement.'"
In addition, Congress should learn from history and restrict its interference with
the President's ability to negotiate. The sixty-year delegation of authority to the
163 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2004). This provides the Oath of Office for members
of Congress:
I . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that
I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and
faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help
me God.
'6 Chip Roh, Opening Remarks at the NAFTA: Reflections on the First Year and Visions
for the Future Symposium in Tucson, Arizona (Feb. 22-24 1995), 12 ARiz. J. INT'L& CoMP.
L. xv, xxiii (1995).
Congress doesn't like fast track in theory because it is, after all, giving up a bit
of its powers. On the other hand, some in Congress, and this is one reason that
the veteran members of Congress sometimes like it better, realize that the handy
thing about fast track is that you've delegated all this responsibility to the
President to make the tradeoffs that come in a trade agreement. What members
of Congress can do then is explain to their constituents who may be disappointed
by one aspect or another of the agreement that: Well, gee, you know, that dumb
President did it, but I had to vote for the agreement because, you know, I had
other constituents that were for it. So by delegating in that way, you can also
delegate blame, which is always a popular thing to do in Washington.
Id.
Congress has shown an increased willingness to delegate substantial legislative powers
to the Executive in the last two years. In addition to reenacting fast-track legislation
permitting the President to regulate international commerce in the fall of 2002, Congress
made a "sweeping delegation of 'Category I' war power to the President" in the fall of 2001.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215,251 (2002).
In authorizing the President "to use force against not only 'nations,' but also 'organizations
or persons' that 'he determines' 'planned, authorized, committed or aided' the September 11
attacks 'or harbored' such organizations or persons," Congress made "an extraordinarily
broad delegation [of power] - arguably the broadest congressional delegation of war power
in our nation's history." Id. at 251-52 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1541, Authorization for Use of
Military Force); see also 139 CONG. REc. S14,780 (daily ed. June 30, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond) (speaking against fast-track legislation on the grounds that fast track is
merely a means "of avoiding the constitutional obligations of this body"); John Hart Ely,
Kuwait, The Constitution, And The Courts: Two Cheers For Judge Greene, 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 1 (1991) (arguing that Congress willingly shirks responsibility whenever it is
politically expedient to do so). Contra Linarelli, supra note 26, at 207 ("Congress... has in
no way abdicated its prerogative over the regulation of foreign commerce. In fact, Congress
has more vigorously asserted its authority in recent trade legislation by imposing substantial
limitations on the President's authority.").
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President resulted from the painful lesson of the Great Depression.165 Congress
passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which drastically increased tariffs,'" in
response to protectionist efforts. 16 7 The high tariffs resulted in retaliatory trade
policies by many trading partners and the U.S. economy suffered.'68
Congress has demonstrated historically that it is ill-suited to directly create
international trade agreements.' 69 Fast-track procedures "reduce[] the haggling,
pork-barreling, and log-rolling typically associated with important political
issues."' 70 Legislators recognize the need to provide some social regulations' 7 ' but
have proven to be unable to appropriately balance the desires of special interest
groups against the well-being of the nation.
TPA "demonstrates to our trading partners the alliance that exists between the
executive and legislative branches to help raise living standards through out [sic]
the world. This is vital to securing new free trade agreements with potential
negotiating partners.' 72  Congressional skepticism regarding international
agreements "ha[s] been created by groups seeking greater environmental and labor
protections; and.., from businesses leery of increased competitive pressures at a
time of domestic economic downturn."1'
The degree of Congressional oversight and intervention provided in the Trade
Act of 2002 will make it difficult for the United States to negotiate trade agreements
under the Act. One of the main advantages of fast track was that the President
could negotiate agreements without pandering to individual lobbies. The creation
of international agreements requires that sacrifices be made in exchange for gains. 74
165 See Taylor, supra note 39, at 17 n.62 (arguing that tariff increases were a cause of the
Great Depression).
'" See Koh, supra note 36, at 1194.
167 See id.
161 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets ofInternational Trade: A Perspective on
the Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 202
n.25 (1987).
69 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
170 Schoenbom, supra note 132, at 139.
171 See Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and
Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and
Safe HarborAgreements, 9 CoLuM. J. EuR. L. 29,30 (2002). Social regulations may prevent
"exposure to lower standards ofgoods, services, labor conditions, and environmental abuses
existing in importing nations," and may be designed to preserve national security or protect
aspects of a culture. Tiefenbrum, supra note 107, at 272.
12 Proclamation No. 7564, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,893 (May 17, 2002).
173 Janigian, supra note 1, at 99.
174 See Holmer & Bello, supra note 66, at 198-99.
Congress must be prepared to shoulder the burden of making trade-offs if it
wishes to be a responsible partner in trade negotiations. The classic public
injunction of the Congress to any administration in trade negotiations is to
achieve 100 percent of all U.S. objectives and to make no concessions. While
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Inserting the extremely political legislative branch directly into the negotiating
forum complicates the process.175 For example, NAFTA-implementing legislation
was almost killed as a result of Congress's reluctance to extend fast track, which
resulted from lobbying by environmental and labor groups.176
Congress should not interfere in the development of additional free-trade
agreements. "Free Trade Agreements have been good for workers at home and in
other countries""' because they "promote exports [and] ... economic efficiency
and foster competitive advantage.""' Although some areas of industry are harmed,
generally, the American public benefits from free trade. "Competition and
integration leadto stronger growth, more and better jobs, more widely shared gains.
Renewed protectionism... would lead to a spiral of retaliation that would diminish
the standard of living for working people everywhere."
179
The Bush Administration has argued that "Trade Promotion Authority deepens
the partnership between the Executive branch and the Congress. It enhances the
trade-related prerogatives of the legislative branch, while providing a structure and
orderly process for the consideration of presidentially-negotiated trade
agreements."'8 0 The Trade Act of 2002 is an improvement over the last eight years
without any fast-track procedure, but it falls far short of the degree of delegation
needed for the President to be able to negotiate effectively. Specifically, the
President is subject to so many limitations and is required to pursue so many
objectives that the give-and-take required to negotiate will be hindered, if not made
completely impossible.
this is an understandable starting point, it is impossible to realize. Negotiations
are based upon compromise. Trade agreements are likely to endure only if they
embody compromise, since sovereign governments adhere over time only to
arrangements that, on balance, serve their interests.
... [Miembers must be prepared to prioritize their objectives and to share
with the administration their advice about negotiating positions.
Id.
'" Id.; see also Koh, supra note 45, at 148, arguing that:
[Fast track] allowed Congress to overcome both the political inertia and the
procedural obstacles that frequently prevent a controversial measure from
coming to a vote at all. Second, it controlled domestic special interest group
pressures that might otherwise have provoked extensive, ad hoc amendment of
a negotiated trade accord. Third, it bolstered the Executive Branch's negotiating
credibility with United States allies.
'76 See supra notes 135-36.
'7 DeBusk, supra note 143, at 141.
178 id.
" William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for
International Labor Standards, 80 NrB. L. REV. 715 (2001) (quoting President William
Jefferson Clinton).
'10 UNrrED STATES TRADE R.EPRESENTATIVE, TRADE PROMOTION AuTHoRITY AND THE
CONGRESS, (2001), at http://www.ustr.gov/new/2001-12-03-tpa-congress.htm.
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Despite the fact that the President and Congress are now of the same political
party, 8 ' the Trade Act of 2002 leaves the President in a position where he must
continually consult with Congress and follow its guidance. For example, during
debate in the Senate following passage of the Trade Act of 2002, Senator Baucus
pointed out that members of Congress would be permitted to attend negotiations.'82
Any deviation from the "approved" plan will result in a "thumbs-down" vote on a
proposed trade agreement. Ultimately, if international trade agreements are
approved, they will be the result of successful lobbies in Congress rather than the
pursuit of free trade, and will benefit a small group rather than the United States as
a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite claims that great strides have been taken toward promoting free trade,8 3
Congress has not granted the President sufficient discretion in international trade
negotiations with the Trade Act of 2002. Instead, Congress has enacted a piece of
legislation that actually usurps presidential powers under the guise of promoting
free trade. In reality, members of Congress continue to hold the reins of commerce,
afraid to let go due to the political ramifications for their constituencies should they
do so. Fear and protectionism abound in the current Congress and will undermine
any real attempts by the President to exert leadership in the arena of free trade. The
Congressional Oversight Group provides a means for Congress to not only keep tabs
on the negotiations through the President, but also to be present and active in
negotiations.' 4
"' When the Trade Act of2002 was enacted, the Senate was controlled by the Democratic
party. The Republicans won control of both houses of Congress in the 2002 elections.
"' See 148 CONG. REC. S 10,660 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus)
(stating "[c]ongressional trade advisers and staff should have access to regularly scheduled
negotiating sessions").
183 See 148 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley):
[T]he underlying premise of the TPA Act of 2002 is to provide the President and
our trade negotiators with flexibility so they can negotiate the best trade
agreements for the American people. It is not intended, nor should it be used,
to try to tie the President's hands on any particular issue.
184 See Christopher S. Rugaber, Trade Policy: Baucus, Other Senators Press Zoellick on
Trade Consultation Issues, 19 INT'LTRADEREP. 1901, Nov. 7, 2002, at 1901. ("[D]esignated
congressional trade advisers and their staff should be able to 'attend and observe' trade
negotiations, and . . . should have access to negotiating documents, with sufficient
opportunity to comment on them .... [T]here should be enough time for reasonable
congressional suggestions to be incorporated into U.S. negotiating positions.") (quoting letter
from Senator Max Baucus et al., to Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative (Oct. 31,
2002)).
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Recognizing that the Constitution gives Congress power over foreign trade
policy, it would be inappropriate for the President to negotiate international trade
agreements without regard to Congressional opinions. Congress is unable to
rationalize the concessions that are necessarily part of the negotiation process,
however. Therefore, it should delegate the determination of the details to the
Executive branch. That will allow the President to follow the policy objectives
provided by Congress while pursuing a realistic strategy of negotiations.
The early fast-track legislation provided this balance of power. The Trade Act
of 2002 does not; it is a sham in which Congress purports to delegate power to the
Executive but keeps such a tight rein that the President cannot effectively negotiate.
When the President goes to the negotiating table, he will get concessions from other
countries and will make concessions in exchange. When he returns to Congress to
report the status of the negotiations, Congress may respond that he violated one of
its directives and may not approve the agreement, forcing the President to return to
the negotiating table. It is unrealistic for Congress to expect to get everything that
it wants without any sacrifices; that is no way to negotiate. Ultimately, the
President holds the constitutional authority to negotiate.'85 The Trade Act of 2002
puts Congress at the negotiating table, which it is not authorized to do under the
Constitution. It is a clear usurpation of presidential power.
Congressional mistrust of the President in the negotiation of international trade
agreements dates back to the Kennedy Round - before fast track was introduced.
It is unreasonable to refuse the President discretion in negotiations based on the
behavior of Presidents prior to the enactment of fast-track legislation. With fast
track, Congress retains the power to ultimately control trade policy without
relinquishing full responsibility.
Because the current Act is effective for seven years, it is impractical to start
from scratch. An initial step would be to modify the Trade Act of 2002 to reduce
the number of requirements by stating them in broader terms. Congressional
participation should be limited to input - setting trade policy goals, which is what
the Constitution authorizes. Congress should not be able to derail negotiations
midway, and certainly should not be permitted to participate in the negotiations -
a power clearly granted to the President. If Congress is dissatisfied, it can inform
the President and discuss what trade-offs it would prefer. If the negotiated
agreement is truly unpalatable to Congress, it can simply refuse to pass the
implementing legislation. Arguments that fast track is an unconstitutional grant of
power to the President are unpersuasive because Congress retains ultimate control
over the legislative process.
Just as the Trade Act of 2002 is not an effective balance of powers, a return to
the status between 1994 and 2002, when the United States had no fast-track
legislation, would be equally inappropriate. The United States has lost credibility
185 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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in negotiations and has lost its position as a leader in trade policy over the last eight
years. Therefore, rather than leaving the President to rely on a purported delegation
of power that does not resolve any of the problems inherent in constitutional
separation of powers, Congress should revise the Trade Act of 2002, removing the
restrictions on the President's constitutional power to negotiate. The President
would then be able to effectively negotiate trade agreements that benefit all people
of the United States.
Laura L. Wright
